Cambridge Companion to Life and Death (Cambridge University Press, 2014)
“Animal Interests,” in Tatjana Višak and Robert Garner, eds., The Ethics of Killing Animals, Oxford University Press, 2016
“Death,” in Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Medicine, London: Routledge, 2017
“The Moral Standing of the Dead,” invited, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 373.1754 (2018)
“Never Existing,” Mortality 23.2 (2018)
I specialize in epistemology and ethics.
Epistemology: In "The Epistemic Predicament" Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (1984) 26-50, p. 38, I defended the condition that has come to be called the safety condition for knowledge. My version was that S knows P only if S's belief P is caused by a sequence of events E each of which is such that if E were to occur P would be true. I then argued that knowledge construed as safety is closed under entailment, and that, as G. E. Moore claimed, we know the denials of skeptical hypotheses.
Ethics: Much of my work on ethics concerns the philosophy of death. In "Annihilation" The Philosophical Quarterly 37 (1985) 233-252, I argue that Epicurus's position that death is not bad for us makes sense only if life is not good for us. In The Philosophy of Death (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) I argue that death is sometimes bad for its victims both in a timeless sense and also retroactively.